report42Mruck5964

FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT AND THE

GERMAN ANTI-NAZI RESISTANCE

n July 20,1944, a bomb exploded in Adolf

Hitler's Führerhauptquartier near Ras-

tenburg, East Prussia. Under the leadership of

Count Claus Schenck von Stauffenberg a con-

spiracy to overthrow the Nazi government

had come close to fruition. The conspirators

wanted to create a decent Germany which

would fulfill its proper role among the nations

of the world. Yet the plot failed. Many of the

conspirators were tried and executed through

the Nazi People's Court. The activities of the

anti-Nazi Resistance reach back to the early

years of the Hitler regime. As early as the

Sudetenland crisis of 1938, highly placed

members of the Army began to play a signifi-

cant role in the Resistance. Their goal of over-

throwing the Nazi regime became increas-

ingly urgent as they realized that Hitler

spelled disaster for Germany.

In the immediate post-World War II years

little was publicized about the story of the

German Resistance. The Cold War and the

birth of the Federal Republic of Germany in

1949 witnessed a growing flow of publications

dealing with this topic. Today there is an

abundance of Resistance literature. Hans

Rothfels German Opposition to Hitler (1948) and

Gerhard Ritter's Carl Goerdeler and the German

Resistance (1956) belong to the early major

works. Today Peter Hoffman's The History of

the German Resistance (1969) and Der Widerstand

gegen den National Sozialismus (1985), edited by

Jürgen Schmäedecke and Peter Steinbach,

must be considered the leading reference

works in the field. They include all aspects of

Resistance history. Karl Dietrich Bracher's

essay "Zur Widerstands-Problematik in

'Rechtsdiktaturen' die deutsche Erfahrung"

in Deutschland zwischen Krieg und Frieden:

Festschrift für Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (1991) is likely

the most recent contribution by the noted

Bonn scholar to the field of Resistance

history. It presents a concise summary of

Bracher's comprehensive knowledge of the

history and the problems of Resistance, which

addresses many of the questions pertaining to

the story of the Resistance. Yet some issues

continue to demand the historian's attention,

among them the problem of the generally

non-productive relationship betwen members

of the Resistance and representatives of the

Roosevelt Administration and the White

House itself. The major source for investigat-

ing this problem are the documents which are

collectively referred to as the "Breaker

Reports," which are deposited in the National

Archives in Washington D.C. This article is

largely based on those documents.

Contacts between members of the anti-

Hitler Resistance and members of the Roose-

velt Administration existed from the early

years of the Hitler regime until after the July

20, 1944, assassination attempt on the dicta-

tor's life. During the late summer and early

fall of 1937, Dr. Carl Gordeler, the former

Lord Mayor of Leipzig and the later "motor of

the Resistance," visited with the endorsement

of the Hitler government Canada and the

United States. The official purpose of Gordel-

er's journey was to gather facts about these

countries and to report his findings to Berlin.

In the States Gordeler met Secretary of State

Cordell Hull, Secretary of War Henry L. Stim-

son, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgen-

thau, George Messersmith of the Department

of State and former President Hoover. Goer-

deler had two goals, he wanted to strengthen

the "Peace Party" in Hitler's circle by emphas-

izing the strength of the Western democra-

cies. He also wanted to establish a personal

relationship with influential personalities of

the Administration so that a basis of opera-

tion and perhaps mutual trust could be

created for the establishment of good rela-

tions between a new German government

and the American government should the

Hitler government be replaced.

In October, 1939, a few weeks after Ger-

many's invasion of Poland, Adam von Trott zu

Solz, Rhodes Scholar and employee of the

German Foreign Office, arrived in America to

participate in a convention of the Institute of

Pacific Relations. Trott travelled with the

approval of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop.

In his request for approval of the journey he

stated that through the convention he would

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obtain valuable insights into power-politics in

the Pacific area as well as the political and

economic involvement of Great Britain and

the U.S.A. He emphasized how much Great

Britain relied on American support. Trott

wrote that he would be able to use his many

contacts, among them Secretary of War Henry

L. Stimson, Colonel William Donovan and

President Roosevelt's friend Harry Hopkins

"in the service of Germany." State Secretary

Weizsäcker supported Trott's request to keep

the United States from entering the war.

During his approximately three-month stay

in the States, Adam von Trott zu Solz met and

interacted with private and public personali-

ties, among them Hamilton Fisk Strong, edi-

tor of the journal Foreign Affairs, Robert Bald-

win of the American Civil Liberties Union,

Felix Morley, editor of the Washington Post,

and Supreme Court justice Felix Frankfurter,

a personal friend of President Roosevelt.

President Roosevelt and F.B.I. Chief Edgar

Hoover must have considered von Trott an

important enough person to have him sha-

dowed by agents of the Bureau throughout

his stay in the United States. According to

F.B.I, reports, Trott was "soliciting the assist-

ance of prominent individuals in the U.S.A. to

support a movement involving the overthrow

of the present regime in Germany."¹ Hoover

also pointed out that von Trott believed that

the socialist circles in Germany and the Soviet

Union would have to cooperate, that the

future Germany would have to consist of a

socialist life-style in a peaceful Europe, and

that ultimately the world would be socialist.

German victory, Trott said, was not obvious.

The allied powers would have to give a new

Germany "a chance" if the resistance effort

were able to set aside Hitler, "but if these

powers deny us this chance (then) we will not

continue to seek their aid but we must con-

sider them our enemies." In a memorandum

for the Department of State, Trott suggests

that the Allies afford the German anti-Hitler

Resistance freedom of action and asks that

they not take advantage of the moment of

military weakness which would necessarily

follow from Hitler's overthrow. He further

asks that the American government not sub-

scribe to the war-guilt thesis of World War I

and that it declare its war-aims openly. The

war, von Trott insisted, should be ended

quickly. An organization for European coop-

eration should be created. In England, von

Trott maintained, there was an influential

group which should not be trusted. This

group might be willing to conclude a peace

with Germany under non-acceptable terms.²

Trott's ideas expressed in the memorandum

came to the attention of Secretary of State

Cordell Hull, Under-Secretary Sumner Welles,

Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau,Justice

Frankfurter and President Roosevelt. Trott's

immediate contact person in the Roosevelt

Administration was Under-Secretary of State

George Messersmith. Trott sought in vain to

confer with the President himself.

Historian Margaret Boveri holds Felix

Frankfurter responsible for preventing Trott's

meeting the President, an allegation that

Frankfurter denied.³ Moreover, Boveri asserts

that "Roosevelt's temporary attention changed

to mistrust and rejection. From this time on he

was convinced that Germany must be pun-

ished and rendered innocuous."4

The State Department file on Trott's activi-

ties carries the heading "Espionage Activi-

ties."5 In a later memorandum to Alexander

Kirk, U.S. Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, Mes-

sersmith advised caution in future dealings

with Trott because of the latter's contacts with

persons who were working for the Hitler

government, although, so he says "this maybe

the price that Trott has to pay to enjoy his

freedom of movement."6

According to Hans Rothfels' pioneering

chapter on Friedensfühler (peace probings) with

the Allied powers, Trott's message was relayed

to F.D.R. directly through the former German

Chancellor Heinrich Burning, who supposedly

visited the White House in December, 1939.

Initially, President Roosevelt seems to have

been interested in supporting the German

Resistance, but "soon thereafter and because

of the influence of persons in F.D.R.'s closer

environment, he declared further contacts to

be uncalled for."7

In March 1940, Under-Secretary Sumner

Welles visited Berlin on a peace mission. Dur-

ing his stay he met Adolf Hitler and the

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former Reichminister Hjalmar Schacht. Sch-

acht informed Sumner Welles that there were

generals in Germany who were willing to

overthrow the Hitler regime, if they received

Allied guarantees that Germany would obtain

a fitting position among the nations of the

world and that it would not be treated as it had

been in 1918. Essentially Schacht made the

same request in Berlin that Trott had made in

the States.

German military victories did not deter

representatives of the Resistance from

searching for opportunities to remain in con-

tact with the Roosevelt Administration or at

least with U.S. citizens who, through their

position, would possibly have access to the

White House. One such opportunity seemed

to offer itself through the American entre-

preneur Federico Stallforth. Stallforth had

been involved in business deals between the

U.S. and the Weimar Republic. He had per-

sonal contacts with political leaders such as

Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Pope Pius XII,

the Kennedys and Dwight D. Eisenhower.

During late June and early July, 1940, Stall-

forth had seen Hermann Goring, who

supposedly submitted a peace plan to him for

the settlement of European issues, which was

then turned down by Churchill and President

Roosevelt. Stallforth travelled at this time with

the official approval of the Nazi-Government8.

For some time in 1941, Stallforth enjoyed the

support of S.S. Obergruppenführer Heydrich,

who was reacting positively to the American

entrepreneur's plan to influence American

public opinion in favor of Germany and

against Great Britain. Stallforth suggested that

he might be able to delay or perhaps even

prevent America's anticipated entry into

World War II. The Auswärtige Amt discovered

early in April, 1941, that Stallforth was not to

be trusted, that he served his own personal

and financial interests only. Hjalmar Schacht

had called Stallforth "a dubious person who

was not always reliable."9 Ilse von Hassell,

wife of the former German ambassador in

Rome and prominent member of the Resist-

ance, wrote that her husband "never totally

lost his reservations in regard to the legiti-

macy of Stallforth."10 In spite of these suspi-

cions the American entrepreneur succeeded

in meeting representatives of the anti-Hitler

group, including high-ranking military lead-

ers and Ulrich von Hassell. To them Stallforth

suggested the creation of a constitutional

monarchy and the overthrow of the Hitler-

Göring regime. This would please the British

and it would make peace with Great Britian

possible.11

In October, 1941, Stallforth had reported to

Roosevelt about his contact with the Resist-

ance and its plans. F.D.R. was elated over

these revelations.12 But a few weeks later Stal-

lforth was declared persona non grata at the

White House.13 Stallforth thought that F.D.R.

had changed his mind about dealing with the

German anti-Hitler Resistance for political

reasons. In order to be re-elected, so Roose-

velt thought, he needed to enter the war on

the side of Great Britain. An incident which

sheds light on President Roosevelt's reaction

to the Resistance and its attempts to obtain

American support is his refusal to receive

Louis P. Lochner of the Berlin Office of the

Associated Press. Lochner had met represen-

tatives of the anti-Hitler group on several

occasions, especially in November, 1941, in

the home of Dr. Joseph Winner, former

Reichstag representative for the Catholic

Center Party. Lochner was asked to inform

the American President of the existence and

the activities of the Resistance. The President

was to let them know his preference for a

future German government. A secret code

was to facilitate direct radio contact between

the Resistance and the White House.14

The entry of the United States into World

War II with the Japanese attack on Pearl Har-

bor and Hitler's subsequent declaration of

war against the United States increased Amer-

ica's interest in the internal affairs of Nazi-

Germany and the German Resistance. To

have a regular channel to the highest level of

the German government providing useful

information offered an opportunity not to be

missed. Thus, in November, 1942, Colonel

William J. Donovan, head of the Office of

Strategic Services, appointed Alan Welsh

Dulles Legal Assistant to the American minis-

ter in Bern, Switzerland. Through Dulles and

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Donovan, the German Resistance had a line

of communication to the White House. The

German Resistance's messenger was Hans

Bernd Gisevius, officially German Vice Con-

sul in Switzerland. Gisevius enjoyed the pro-

tection of the Abwehr, the German equivalent

of the Office of Strategic Services. Another

go-between for Dulles and Gisevius was Mary

Bancroft, who had become a friend of both.

Messages about the anti-Hitler group were

sent with increasing frequency, especially as

the summer of 1944 approached and plans to

assassinate Adolf Hitler and topple the Nazi-

regime were maturing. Especially important

messages from Dulles/Donovan were accom-

panied by a brief cover-note from William,

"Wild Bill" Donovan to Roosevelt's personal

secretary Grace Tulley. These cover-notes

read, "Dear Grace: Would you please make

sure that the President sees this." Miss Tulley

assured me in a personal interview that she

did make sure that F.D.R. saw those messages.

Thus we know that President Roosevelt was

well informed about the German Resistance.

Eleanor Roosevelt wrote a brief letter to this

author stating that her husband knew about

the Resistance, "but it was little."15

While the flow of information from Berlin

to Bern and from Bern to Washington, includ-

ing the White House, was steady, the response

in the opposite direction was thin. The Resist-

ance desired an endorsement and recogni-

tion of their existence and support of their

proposed action to overthrow the Hitler

regime. They desired an Allied declaration

that they — the Allies —would recognize the

new Germany and that they would favor a just

and fair peace. The unconditional surrender

formula of early 1943 was the opposite of what

the anti-Nazi Resistance had asked for.

Understandably, the opposition in Ger-

many was frustrated, but so was the O.S.S.'s

spokesman in Bern, Alan Welsh Dulles. In a

message of January, 1944, Dulles wrote, "I

would appreciate hearing of any indication

with which you would supply me regarding

what you would be interested in achieving via

the Breakers (code-name for the Resistance).

I do not understand what our policy is and

what offers, if any, we could give to any resist-

ance movement."16 A detailed message which

Dulles forwarded to Washington notes that

labor leaders of the Resistance urge F.D.R.

and Churchill to reveal practical goals for the

future of Central Europe. Military victory will

mean little, the note insisted, if the uncer-

tainty of the situation were not clarified in the

near future; "peace will be quickly lost and

new dictatorships may take the place of the

one in Central Europe." The labor leaders of

the German Opposition also raised the spec-

ter of a Central Europe in despair which

would be a fertile field for the growth of

communism. Bombs and air leaflets should

not be dropped at the same time.17

Five days before the assassination attempt

on July 20, 1944, O.S.S. Bern suggested to

Washington that F.D.R. issue a declaration in

which he should state that the Allies do not

intend the destruction of Germany. The dec-

laration should also encourage anti-Nazi for-

ces.18 O.S.S. Chief Donovan did not react

favorably. He wired back to Bern that "your

jobs have all involved merely the passive

acceptance of intelligence regarding the

desire of the Breakers to find some way out.

You have done no bargaining of any kind."19

One concern was the Soviet Union, which

apparently had no knowledge of the O.S.S.'s

dealings with the anti-Hitler Opposition.

General Watts and Ambassador Winant in

London agreed to inform the Soviets,20 but

Bern opposed the London position and at the

same time wired to London that the Breakers

were entirely on their own and had received

neither encouragement nor political news.21

The decision to release or not release infor-

mation to Moscow was left with Washington.

A description of contacts between the

Roosevelt Administration or self-appointed

representatives of the United States and

members of the anti-Hitler Opposition and

an evaluation of the reception of these "con-

tacts" leaves one major question unanswered:

why did the Resistance receive neither sup-

port nor even encouragement from the F.D.R.

Administration? The answer can only be spe-

culative. It was not President Roosevelt's prac-

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tice to make marginal comments on messages

that came to his desk. Nor are we privy to the

deliberations in the White House Map Room,

which was the place where important discus-

sions took place. No minutes were kept. No

tapes were produced. Yet, some tentative

answers are possible:

(1) Roosevelt and his administration did

not entirely trust the representatives of

the Resistance. Their credentials led to

the fear of duplicity. Leaders of the

Resistance were often identical with the

conservative Prussian Junker class.

(2) There was concern about the Soviet

Union. One did not want to give Stalin

more reason to suspect the loyalty and

reliability of his partners in the West.

The interests of the Western Allies

would not be served by another Soviet-

German rapprochement. Allied-Soviet

cooperation was considered essential

to achieve victory and had to be

safeguarded.

(3) There was no assurance that the

Resistance would be successful in rid-

ding Germany of the Nazi regime. What

would be the consequence of a civil war

in Germany? Would such a conflict pos-

sibly see the Western powers and the

Soviet Union on opposite sides?

(4) If the anti-Hitler Opposition were to

succeed, how would one deal with the

new government of the "other, the

decent Germany"? Again, there would

be at least the potential for a West-East

split which may have been an intention

of the Resistance.

(5) President Roosevelt did not relish the

thought of a possible repetition of

1918/1919, when a new German

government had to be dealt with. It was

inside the Weimar Republic that the

"stab-in-the-back legend,"; which

helped the Nazis come to power, had

grown.

(6) By July, 1944, weeks after the successful

invasion, victory, so one thought, was

close at hand. A complete victory over

Germany, accompanied by an uncondi-

tional surrender appeared to create a

more solid basis of bringing about

peace in Europe. Roosevelt was the pol-

itician who preferred to deal with pol-

itical/military realities rather than with

indefinite and insecure potentialities.

Often, when F.D.R. was asked what his

ideas were for peace, he answered "let

us win the war first", and so it was with

Germany and its anti-Hitler Resistance.

In retrospect it is possible to appreciate the

Roosevelt Administration's non-supportive

behavior. It makes the efforts of the Resist-

ance shine the brighter. They can claim that

their ultimate motivation to overthrow the

Nazi regime was ethical, that they acted in

spite of only slim chances of success. They

acted because their conscience ordered them

to do so.

—Armin Mruck

Towson State University

NOTES

Hoover to General Watson, Secretary to the President,

White House,January 16, 1940).

Department of State, MS 862.20211.

Der Verrat im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert (Hamburg

1956),72-73.

Boveri, 72-73.

State Department #862.20211.

Messersmith to Kirk, December 8, 1939, Memorandum

for the File, Department of State, Assistant Secretary,

#862.20211.

Rothfels, Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler, Fischer

Bücherei 1958,145.

Auswärtiges Amt, Inland II G, 517, 217293, 217290,

217292.

Hjalmar Schacht to author, January 6,1958; February

9, 1957.

Ilse von Hassell to author, June 11, 1957.

Whitney/Stallforth-Donovan Memorandum.

Stallforth, in an interview with author.

Stallforth, in an interview with author; cf. Georg

Schöllen, U. v. Hassell, 1881-1944 Ein Konservativer in der

Opposition (1990), 25 ff..

Rothfels, Verrat, 146.

Mrs. Roosevelt to the author, personal letter.

O.S.S., Official Dispatch from Bern, 27January, 1944.

Dulles from Bern, 27 Jan. 1944.

O.S.S. Bern, 15 July 1944, Breakers, #4111-12.

O.S.S. director to Bern, 26 July, 1944.

Ustravic, London-Bern, Breakers #62869, 24 July,

1944.

O.S.S. Bern to London, July 26, 1944, #855-7.

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Immigrant children waiting for processing at Ellis Island.

Courtesy National Park Service: Statue of Liberty National Monument.

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